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Editorial Note: 
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1.0  Introduction 
 
1.1  Migration is a growing phenomenon internationally.  Between 1960 and 2000 
international migrants in Africa increased from 9 million to 16 million. Although Africa 
has experienced a drop in the number of international migrants over the last two decades, 
it has more than double the number of migrants than Latin America and the Caribbean, 
and between a half and a third of the number in Asia. Flows of people from country to 
country across the continent are increasingly significant. Migration between cities across 
the continent is becoming a common phenomenon, as households attempt to secure their 
livelihoods. 
 
1.2 In addition to cross-border migration into cities, high population growth rates and 
rural-urban migration contribute to creating one of the world’s fastest urbanisation rates. 
It is estimated that almost half (46%) of Africa’s projected population will live in cities 
by the year 2020. Cities are also the continent’s engines of growth. Statistics show that 
urban economies in Africa contribute a larger proportion to the GDP than rural 
economies, which house the majority of the continent’s population. Fully, 34% of 
Africa’s population is urbanised, and this population contributes more than half (60%) of 
the continent’s Gross Domestic Product. 
 
1.3 These factors suggest the need to ensure that adequate political and policy attention is 
given to cities. But policy logics do not always fit reality. Post-independence policy 
interventions have focussed more on developing rural areas for a number of reasons. 
Rural populations were larger than urban ones, and rural areas were seen as the mainstay 
of urban economies—providing both food and raw material for urban industry. African 
governments and aid agencies in the 1960s and the following decades worried about the 
development inequalities between rural areas, the ripple effect this would have on 
population movements, and the sustainability of cities. Policies therefore aimed at 
curbing rural-urban migration through instigating growth in the agricultural and primary 
industry sectors with the objective of securing employment and livelihoods for rural 
dwellers. To boost rural development, co-operatives were set up; agricultural boards 
financed; rural areas electrified; feeder roads constructed; water programmes initiated; 
and, farming subsidies rolled out/extended. Politically, governments also felt the need to 
‘reach’ their rural citizens, and control rural economies. 
 
1.4 In the cities, governments seemed to have some form of control. After all, there was a 
strong presence of government administration and business institutions in capital cities 
(and other major towns), and there already existed fairly adequate levels of infrastructure. 
In fact, most colonial governments developed some road networks, housing, water and 
electrical infrastructure. The urgency to develop urban areas was therefore much less than 
the need to bolster rural areas. This is not to say that no new development took place in 
urban areas. Indeed, many cities expanded their housing and infrastructure programs to 
accommodate the influx of people from rural areas during this time. But the key to 
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successful urban areas and productive economies was perceived as a rural function – if 
rural areas succeeded, so too would cities.   
 
1.5 The anti-urban bias, driven largely by government and development aid agencies, 
resulted in the neglect of urban spaces and populations. Combined with low economic 
growth rates, the negative impact of Structural Adjustment Programs on households, and 
the inability of city governments to provide services and enforce by-laws, this spawned a 
severe management crisis. Partly as a consequence of governments’ inability to foster and 
promote an environment which enables households to secure sustainable livelihoods, the 
majority of the activities taking place in African cities are outside the formal sector: 
 
It is not simply…the breakdown of public infrastructure, service deterioration, or 
managerial inefficiency…it is the remarkable resilience of non state agencies to 
challenge the monopoly of state institutions in shaping the character of cities 
today, which is of striking importance. In most Third World cities, the bulk of 
housing, transportation, employment and trade takes place outside formal state 
institutions (McCarney 1996:11) 
 
1.6 In East African cities, two thirds of the population live outside planned settlements with 
little or no infrastructure, while 75% of the labour force is engaged in activities in the 
informal sector (Halfani 1996). Local authorities regulate only 25% of the activities that 
take place within urban boundaries. Environmental and human degradation, together with 
high levels of poverty social polarisation and deprivation, have become defining 
characteristics of African cities. Despite these harsh realities, cities continue to be 
‘people’ magnets’ attracting migrants from rural areas as well as political and economic 
immigrants from other countries. It is estimated that international migrants in Southern 
Africa constituted and estimated 0.6% of the population in 2000. The figure is larger in 
other regions in Africa; in West Africa and East Africa international migrants comprise 
2.7% and 1.8% of the population respectively. In South Africa, the majority of the 
migrants find their way to the country’s major cities, attracted by the possibility of better 
economic, political and social opportunities. 
 
1.7 This policy briefly questions the ability of formal developmental interventions to 
understand local contexts, and, by extension, govern urban spaces. It interrogates the 
relevance and implications of initiatives like the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD)—which speak largely of formal interactions and formal 
economies—for urban development and the politics of claim-making with particular 
reference to Johannesburg. Brief commentary is provided on how NEPAD perceives 
migrants and their rights in the city, region or nation-state. The paper shows through a 
case study of the lives of migrants in inner city Johannesburg how a significant number 
of households continue to survive and are supported through informal networks which are 
outside the state, and how the state is often unable to harness or control these processes. 
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2.0   A New Commitment? 
 
2.1  The recent focus on cities and processes of urbanisation by the African Union may turn 
the tide for Africa’s migrants and the urban poor. In July 2003, the AU Summit held in 
Maputo (Mozambique) made a decision to promote the development of sustainable cities 
and towns in Africa. This decision was described as a ‘breakthrough,’ because it was the 
first time that urbanisation, and the challenges of facing African cities had featured on the 
organisation’s agenda (UN-Habitat 2003). The decision by the AU assembly could not 
have come at a more opportune time. 
 
2.2 The recognition at the highest policy level in Africa of the disjuncture between the real 
and potential socio-economic significance of African cities on the one hand, and the 
inability of city governments to provide social and economic security to majority of their 
citizens, on the other, is important. This is because it provides decision-makers the 
opportunity and political space to really understand their cities; the people who live in 
them; and, how (and when) they choose to engage and disengage with the formal state 
apparatus. For it is only when these dynamics are understood, that state institutions can 
begin to rise to the challenge of truly governing African cities. The establishment of a 
NEPAD city partnership programme—with seven cities across the continent—creates an 
opportunity for state and civil society organisations to understand the survival and 
livelihood strategies that the majority of African households rely upon, and to develop 
strategies that respond more appropriately to them. 
 
2.3 Although the core NEPAD strategy document pays scant attention to urban areas, its 
policies impact on urban areas in three fundamental ways (NEPAD 2001). Firstly, it 
seeks to address the challenges confronted in providing adequate, reliable, accessible and 
affordable infrastructure. To this end, the policy suggests public private partnerships 
(PPPs) which encourage investment in infrastructure, and establishing frameworks that 
encourage market competition in service provision. Additionally, the document stresses 
the importance of involving both urban and rural poor in ‘building, maintaining and 
managing infrastructure’ (NEPAD 2001). Secondly, the democracy and political 
governance initiative of the NEPAD strategy aims at strengthening the political and 
administrative structures of African governments, and aligning these structures to 
principles of democracy, transparency, accountability, integrity, respect for human rights 
and the promotion of the rule of law. These transformations apply to city governments as 
well. Thirdly, the NEPAD strategy is firmly rooted in facilitating the integration of 
African economies. The strategy recognises that to accomplish this objective it needs to 
create an environment that allows for the ease of flow of both goods and people across 
borders. One of the aims of the transport sector strategy for example, is to ‘reduce delays 
in cross-border movement of people, goods and services.’ Pursuant to this, the strategy 
suggests that customers and immigration procedures are harmonised, and air and 
passenger freight links are increased across the continent. By implication, cities like 
Johannesburg will continue to be sites of increased flows of both people and goods. This 
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has implications for city administrations as their capacity to manage the ebb and flow of 
people within and through their domains will be tested. 
 
2.4 Reflecting on these defining tenets of NEPAD’s urban governance strategy, a number of 
issues come to the fore. The vision for greater integration recognises the link between 
migration and increased trade, and aims to facilitate the movement of people (and their 
goods) across borders. This has significant implications for migration policy across the 
continent, and particularly for South Africa. This is because since 1990, South Africa has 
experienced an increased inflow of documented and undocumented migrants, as well as 
asylum seekers and refugees from the rest of the continent. South Africa’s official policy 
responses have been ambiguous, with different levels of government responding 
differently to foreign migration. NEPAD seemingly calls for more relaxed immigration 
laws and greater facilitation of movement of people between countries on the continent. 
The impact of this on current South African policy—criticized variously for being 
stringent and xenophobic—remains unclear. 
 
2.5 It is also unclear what impact NEPAD’s attempt to integrate the continent will have on 
existing transitional trade routes and networks, particularly those networks that remain 
invisible to states. Since the 1990s, South Africa had experienced unprecedented growth 
in trans-continental informal trade networks with large flows of money and goods, both 
legal and illicit, already flowing across borders on the continent (Crush and McDonald 
2002). Will restructuring border policies and standardising visa and custom requirements 
allow for greater control of these networks by the state? Is control what is sought by the 
NEPAD policy? Will it ease the movement of poor households whose survival strategies 
rely on frequent border crossings? Will this in turn alleviate poverty? What implications 
will these strategies have for urban households and poverty? 
 
2.6 NEPAD seems to advocate greater movement across borders to alleviate poverty and 
foster economic integration. Whether these policies can actually be implemented remains 
to be seen as they not only touch on sensitive political issues, but also question state 
sovereignty, and the ability of states to control national borders. A reading of South 
Africa’s new migration legislation shows its preference for formally skilled, resourced 
and entrepreneurial individuals. Ordinary people, even though they may have secondary 
and tertiary education, and may prove to be adept entrepreneurs, are not considered 
seriously because they are perceived as draining existing social resources. Rather, it is 
high flying ‘would class’ companies and individuals that are sought. Johannesburg’s 
2003 development strategy also aggressively courts big investors and global 
entrepreneurs in the search for world class status. Much is said about global capital flows 
and making Johannesburg party to these networks. No mention is made of the grassroots 
networks that have come to characterise and sustain a sizable proportion of the city. 
 
2.7 Johannesburg’s aspiration to become an ‘African Global City’ emanates from a discourse 
that categorises cities by their ability to capture ‘command and control’ functions of 
multinational corporations. Understanding cities by their ability to attract and retain these 
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corporations has led to the establishment of a hierarchy, which is topped by London, 
Tokyo and New York (Friedmann 1986). No African cities make the mark; although 
Johannesburg was recently ranked among the top 55 cities in the world (the only African 
city to achieve such status) because of the role it plays within the global economic 
system. But this understanding of cities not only negates the importance of other city 
functions—a site of leisure and culture and for social and political interactions—it 
obliterates households whose unregulated economic strategies from below are lost in the 
hype. There is a ‘globalisation from below’ that is unrecognised within existing policy 
focused almost exclusively on big global movements of capital. How can policy reconcile 
these two distinct processes? It would be unfair to second-guess the NEPAD strategy, 
except to say that it remains unclear whether NEPAD would indeed support the kinds of 
‘global’ movements, transactions and networks that are becoming common. For cities 
like Johannesburg, the bias is clear. The question is whether the AU’s and NEPAD’s 
focus on urbanisation can inject new approaches to improve our understanding of and 
responses to vulnerable urban households and their survival strategies. 
 
2.8 The actions suggested in NEPAD as they relate to service provision, administrative 
transformation and governance, community participation in infrastructure development, 
accountability and transparency are not novel. Such policies have been tried and tested 
across the continent with varying levels of success. The point here though, is not that 
these strategies are ‘old’ or lack innovation but that they seek to strengthen formal 
administrative mechanisms that currently have limited management control over the 
majority of people and the transactions occurring within cities. The suggested actions 
assume that strengthening city government administrations, improving service delivery 
and enhancing democratic processes will inevitably deliver firm control of the informal 
(unregulated) sector. Or, put differently, that a more efficient, effective and responsive 
city administration will provide adequate incentives to lure citizens back into the formal 
economy, where they will be willing to operate within the confines of its rules and 
regulations. Efficiency is essential in any bureaucracy, and presumably, a good number 
of households turn to the informal economy because of their frustrations with the 
inability of the state to respond to their needs. However, there is a limit to which 
technocratic responses guarantee citizen compliance, just as there is a limit to the extent 
that technocratic processes can read and understand many of the ‘informal’ transactions 
that occur outside the formal state. 
 
3.0  Africa’s Cities and Their Dynamics 
 
3.1  Many households in Africa are increasingly turning to cross-border migration as a 
household survival strategy. The decision to send a member of the family to another 
country is often deliberated by family members, who frequently contribute to the cost of 
the journey. Yet even among forced migrants, not all members of the household emigrate. 
Factors such as money and age influence who, and how many members of a family, will 
move to another country. But another important calculation is made. Households will 
often choose the members who are most likely to find work and support their family back 
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home. Similarly, rarely does the whole household emigrate. Often, one or two members 
of a household emigrate to the new host city, and once they are able to support 
themselves, they may ‘send’ for other family members. Barring a war completely 
ravaging a particular community, a base is always retained in the country of origin. This 
way, to use economic parlance, households are able to spread their risk and optimise the 
resources available to them. 
 
3.2  Households across the continent employ a diverse range of survival strategies, and cross-
border migration to cities is becoming an increasingly important one for many. A 2003 
survey by the Forced Migration Studies Programme at Wits University provides 
supporting evidence for this. According to the survey—which focussed on communities 
from refugee producing countries—half of those interviewed left their countries to escape 
war and conflict. More than a third (36.8%) also said that they left their countries for 
economic reasons—to find jobs and seek an improved standard of living. When asked the 
primary reason for moving to South Africa (Johannesburg), the relative importance of 
economic and political reasons even out. In fact, the possibilities of finding economic 
opportunities in South Africa gain slightly more significance than political freedom. A 
significant number of émigrés (86.1%) claim that there are still members of households 
left in their country of origin, and frequent contact is maintained with them. Generally, it 
is single males between 18 and 35 years of age that migrate, the majority of whom 
(54.2%) have completed secondary schooling. About 18% of the migrants have finished 
tertiary education (university degree or diploma). Approximately eighty percent of those 
surveyed lived in a city most of their lives before leaving their country of origin. 
 
3.3 On arrival, most migrants stay with friends from their country of origin. They learn about 
their first residence mainly through friends and a few through family and relatives. It is 
through these networks that housing is accessed, job opportunities are created, ‘papers’ 
(South African documentation, or visas) are sorted out, loans become available, security 
is provided, rules and regulations are established, and compliance is sought. It is in this 
‘unofficial’ and ‘unregulated’ realm that many migrants in inner city Johannesburg live. 
 
3.4 After 1990, many Africans on the continent were able to travel to South Africa as their 
governments lifted the travel boycott in place during the apartheid era. Increasing 
political and social turmoil on the continent in Rwanda, Sudan, Somalia, Nigeria, DRC, 
Burundi and so on triggered the movement of people to South Africa, which was 
perceived as relatively peaceful. A growing economic crisis on the continent also acted as 
a ‘push’ factor for many seeking wealth and economic opportunities in a country 
perceived as being one of the wealthiest on the continent. Johannesburg is one of the 
major magnets attracting foreigners, quite predictably because it is the country’s 
economic capital, potentially offering a variety of economic opportunities to newcomers. 
The inner city is a particularly attractive property and the potential business opportunities 
available render it an important first stop for incoming migrants. 
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3.5 Ironically, the opportunities that inner city Johannesburg promises migrants are in reality 
very limited, or in many cases non-existent. Living conditions are often harsh, business 
and economic opportunities constrained, with few households able to make ends meet. 
Research conducted in the inner city reveals that migrants live in conditions that are often 
worse than those in their home countries. Accommodation is in shared, overcrowded, 
poorly maintained flats. Many buildings housing migrants in the inner city lack electricity 
or water, and most contravene local government safety and health by-laws. 
 
3.6 Similarly, business or work opportunities are limited. The Wits Survey indicates that few 
migrants have formal employment. Of the foreign migrants interviewed, over two-thirds 
were self employed, i.e. running small businesses and income generation projects. As 
migrants are often undocumented, they are unable to secure formal sector employment 
even though they are often relatively well-qualified (Morris and Bouillon 2001). Many 
are involved in informal businesses such as selling vegetables, clothes and other goods on 
street pavements or municipal markets. Others run small businesses such as welding, 
hairdressing, tailoring and retailing shops. Even where these initiatives have managed to 
support families, revenue streams are threatened because of the precarious status of 
informal small businesses.  
 
3.7 The experience of Johannesburg’s new immigrants mirror those of a growing number of 
increasingly displaced people who work their way through the continent’s cities in search 
of more stable and sustainable livelihoods. Illegal migrants are particularly vulnerable 
and are often forced to remain invisible from the state, conducting many of their 
transactions outside the government-regulated realm. Research on migrants in 
Johannesburg has shown that all foreigners, notwithstanding their status, feel a great deal 
of insecurity and are particularly vulnerable to exploitation by the police, landlords, and 
xenophobic attacks from South Africans. Even refugee groups and ‘legal aliens,’ who are 
entitled to services, and permitted to work, state that they live in constant fear of arrest, 
and restrict their movements to avoid any encounter with the law. 
 
3.8 The effort of the Johannesburg Council to ‘reformat’ street traders is a good illustration. 
Hawkers, and unregulated street traders in Johannesburg city had (according to the 
Council, some residents, shop and property owners) become a ‘problem’ that needed to 
be dealt with. For the Council, it was not only that they were an ‘eyesore,’ interfering 
with street paths, harbouring criminal elements and causing ‘crime and grime’ in the city; 
it was that the city could not control them. They did not know how many there were; how 
many were foreign nationals or locals; they did not know where to find them if they 
needed answers; and they could not tax them if they so wished. The city’s solution was to 
set up formal trading markets where all traders would have to register. They would be 
allocated a carefully measured space and systems devised to record and track where and 
who was trading; what they were selling; and how many there were. This would not only 
take the street traders off the street and wipe out the crime and grime that their presence 
supposedly caused; it would also ensure that they could pin down those not paying for 
their rates and services at the market. 
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3.9 Viewed synoptically, Council had done it again: reclaimed the streets from the rowdy and 
unruly rabble. Order was restored through the creation of a neat, tidy, regulated and 
controlled space for hawkers. But things did not quite work out as planned. For a while 
the hawkers refused to use the new market. When they finally moved in, they refused to 
pay rent which they argued was too high. Many of the hawkers said that they had lost 
business because they relied largely in previous locations on the spontaneity of by-
passers. Sales dropped for many who were unable to obtain prime positions on stands 
facing the pavements. The added pressure of having to pay the rents made it impossible 
for some to eke out a living. The Council still struggles to collect rates, and some 
hawkers, rightly or wrongly, still argue that they were better off on the streets. 
 
3.10 Policy-makers are no closer to ‘seeing’ cities and understanding them now than they were 
during apartheid. It is not a surprise that when confronted with the question of what the 
Joburg Council can do about migrants in the inner city, its usual response is: “We want to 
know why they are here, where they live, and whether they have the necessary 
documentation.” And this is understandable; an institution requires some basic level of 
information (formatted in a way it understands), before it can size up the magnitude of 
the problem and provide a budget for the implementation of programmes; viz. 
deportation, social welfare, or economic programmes. But the likelihood of making the 
inner city ‘legible,’ and obtaining migrant information in a format which the state can 
digest/process (e.g. base line data on migrant numbers and status) is extremely difficult, 
not least because migrants do not want the state to ‘see’ them. 
 
3.11 Suppose that miraculously this data is collected and the council is able to use it, what will 
they make of it? Will they move closer to understanding the intricate web of transactions 
and household livelihoods that connect the continent? Would the state be able to respond 
adequately to the needs of these vulnerable households? Indeed, it is not merely a 
question of state capacity to respond to vulnerable households, but its ability to ‘see’ and 
understand local contexts. Arguably, the nature of local government adds very little to the 
‘seeing’ and ‘understanding’ capabilities of the state. Moreover, it is less a question of 
whether the state has the wherewithal to respond to local contexts but, more pertinently, 
that it is partially blind, failing to see and understand what it is that it is trying to control. 
 
3.12 What kind of government will engage with the whole city rather than the part it can see 
or ‘speak’ to? What kind of government will understand that informal and engage with it 
on its own terms? There seems agreement in the urban governance literature that current 
state-centered attempts to manage cities have proven ineffective. Rather than managing 
cities along the traditional lines of regulation, through ‘strong’ bureaucratic 
administration, urban governance should consist of forging new kinds of relationships 
between city governments and other local institutions (McCarney 1996). The way in 
which these relationships are forged is a matter of debate. Friedman (nd) argues that it is 
through a renewed belief in democratic politics. This translates—at the very least—into 
creating a space of real political engagement where urban government seeks and forms 
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alliances with like-minded sectors of civil society and engages or negotiates with its 
opponents. The argument is that formal state-led participatory processes tend to avoid 
real deliberation and institutionalise democracy in ways that are exclusionary (Friedman 
nd). 
 
3.13 Swilling et al (2002) stress the need for understanding urban management as a relational 
process; i.e. building ‘relational webs’ between the range of stakeholders and actors in 
the cities in formal, informal and unregulated spheres. This not only acknowledges those 
sectors of society that are sought by local government—the high flying investors—but 
also the networks and relationships that occur at very local levels. Through these 
processes new agendas and priorities begin to emerge, as different groups create new 
opportunities for claim making. But it is not just the agendas that change, new processes 
of managing cities are created as local governments are compelled to respond to the 
demands made by new relationships. 
 
4.0  Conclusion 
 
4.1  What is the future of migrants and the multitude of household networks across the 
African continent? Can current NEPAD initiatives take us a step closer to understanding 
how a city like Johannesburg can be governed? The acknowledgement of migration as 
integral to successful economic integration between cities and states in Africa affirms the 
realities of many households on the continent. It also confirms what households on the 
continent seem to have figured out; survival is increasingly dependent on movement and 
interactions that undermine political borders. Policy interventions will therefore need to 
take cognisance of these processes. 
 
4.2  What remains to be seen is whether initiatives like NEPAD’s seven-city programme will 
provide an opportunity for questioning current modes of governance and generating 
alternatives. What is clear is that traditional modes of governance cannot adequately 
respond to the needs of the majority of households in cities. What is also obvious is the 
resilience of households across the continent, and their ability to adapt in the face of 
growing poverty and unresponsive governments.  
 
4.3  This is cold comfort to the majority of households in African cities who barely manage to 
eke out a living, but presents an opportunity for policy makers and governments to 
provide enabling environments for the flourishing of household survival strategies. The 
spirit of the NEPAD strategy can certainly be read as wanting to support vulnerable 
households, including migrants. It is important, however, that governments begin to think 
outside of the current new public management paradigm, and allow the processes that 
take place in the city to influence its transformation. 
 
Caroline Kihato 
University of the Witwatersrand 
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